ANTITRUST-PRICE FIXING-VERTICAL NON-PRICE RESTRAINT
OF TRADE NOT ILLEGAL PER SE UNDER SHERMAN AcT-Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515
(1988).

Contracts restraining trade have been actionable from early
common law.' Congress, by enacting the Sherman Act in 1890,
extended federal jurisdiction over restraint of trade in interstate
commerce. 2 The Sherman Act's broad scope brought the full
weight of the common law to bear on situations involving restraint of trade.3
The anti-social impact of horizontal 4 restraint of trade agreements has long been an accepted fact.5 The application of antitrust law to vertical restraint, 6 however, continues to undergo
review and modification. The most recent holding by the United
States Supreme Court in this narrow arena, Business Electronics
Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,7 requires the application of the rule
of reason 8 to vertical non-price combinations resulting in the reI United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), af'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
First. The mischief which may arise from them (1) to the party by the
loss of his livelihood and the subsistence of his family; (2) to the public
by depriving it of an [sic] useful member. Another reason is the great
abuses these voluntary restraints are liable to; as, for instance, from corporations who are perpetually laboring for exclusive advantages in
trade, and to reduce it into as few hands as possible.
Id. at 279 (quoting Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 190 (1711)).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
This authority is granted to Congress pursuant to U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl.
3.
3 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50-60 (1911).
4 See Hay, Vertical Restraints After Monsanto, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 418 n.2 (1985).
Horizontal restraints are imposed across a level of distribution (between distributors or between retailers, i.e., among competitors) while vertical restraints are between different levels of distribution such as a manufacturer and distributor or
retailer. Horizontal restraints may be characterized as being cross-industry,
thereby restraining interbrand competition, while vertical restraints are within one
chain of distribution and tend to restrain intrabrand competition. See generally Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48
U. Cm. L. REV. 6 (1981).
5 Mitchell, 1 P. Wins. at 183. "A grant [of a charter] to particular persons for the
sole exercise of any known trade ... is void, because it is a monopoly, and against
the policy of the common law, and contrary to Magna Charta." Id.
6 See supra note 4.
7 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
8 See infra note 23.
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straint of trade.
In 1968, Business Electronics Corporation (BEC) was the
sole electronic calculator dealer for Sharp Electronics Corporation (Sharp) in the Houston, Texas area. 9 After several years,
Sharp permitted a second dealer, Hartwell, to commence operations as an additional retailer of Sharp products in the Houston
market.' 0 Approximately one year later, Hartwell complained to
Sharp concerning BEC's continuing discount sales strategy."
Hartwell delivered an ultimatum regarding BEC to Sharp concerning BEC's sales strategy.' 2 Subsequently, Sharp
terminated
3
BEC as a dealer in Sharp electronic calculators.'
BEC brought an action in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, alleging Sherman Act violations by Sharp. 4 Ajury entered judgment in favor of BEC.' 5 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on the basis of error in the lower court's jury instruction. 16 In remanding, the Fifth Circuit held that there must be an
agreement to set prices in order for there to be a per se violation. 17 Moreover, an agreement to terminate a price cutting
competitor may violate the Sherman Act, but must be evaluated
9 Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 780 F.2d 1212, 121415 (5th Cir. 1986), afd, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
10 Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1517.
11 Id. at 1518. Sharp provided its retailers with lists suggesting retail prices. Id.
Sharp's agreements with its retailers, however, did not require them either to observe such prices nor suggested any other price. Id. BEC's prices were regularly
below Sharp's suggested retail prices as well as Hartwell's prices. Id. Hartwell's
primary contention, however, was that BEC was " 'free riding' on Hartwell's provision of presale educational and promotional services by providing inadequate services." Id. "Free riding" is a term used to indicate a discounter who takes advantage
of the service or advertising investment of a full price interbrand competitor serving the same market. Sharp, 780 F.2d at 1221 n.3 (Jones, J., concurring).
12 Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1518.
13 Id.
14 See Sharp, 780 F.2d at 1214.

15 Id.

16 See id. at 1219-20. The district court had instructed the jury that "an agreement between Sharp and Hartwell to terminate BEC because of the latter's price
cutting constitute[d] aperse violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 1215.
The specific instruction to the jury was:
The Sherman Act is violated when a seller enters into an agreement or
understanding with one of its dealers to terminate another dealer because of the other dealer's price cutting. Plaintiff contends that Sharp
terminated Business Electronics in furtherance of Hartwell's desire to
eliminate Business Electronics as a price cutting rival.
Id.
17 Id. at 1218.
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under the rule of reason standard."8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' 9 and affirmed the
Fifth Circuit's decision. 20 The Court held that absent "some
agreement on price or price levels," non-price vertical agreements are not per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 2 '
The law on vertical agreements in restraint of trade has seen
22
considerable development over the life of the Sherman Act.

Ordinarily a reviewing court determines whether a particular
agreement violates section 1 of the Sherman Act by utilizing the
rule of reason.23 There are, however, instances where courts
have held vertical agreements to be per se illegal.24
The United States Supreme Court's 1911 decision in Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 25 initially deemed re-

sale price maintenance to be illegal per se. In Dr.Miles, the Court
invalidated price fixing agreements between a manufacturer and
its wholesalers and retailers. 26 The Court reasoned that, after receiving reasonable compensation for its product, a manufacturer
possessed no further interest in the product and that "the public
is entitled to whatever advantage
may be derived from competi27
tion in the subsequent traffic."

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Holmes recognized the difference between agreements designed to close a given market to
outside parties and those that tend to control the destiny of one's
own product. 28 The Justice reasoned that a manufacturer's sales
Id. at 1216.
19 Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 482 U.S. 3182 (1987).
20 Sharp, 108 S.Ct. 1515, 1525 (1988).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1519. See, e.g., Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977) (vertical non-price restraints pertaining to exclusive territories are not per
se illegal); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1957) (vertical restraints not price related are not per se illegal); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (vertical agreements concerning resale prices
are per se illegal).
23 Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1519. In applying the rule of reason, "the factfinder
weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition." Id.
(quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)). Id.
24 Id. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1985), wherein the court stated that certain conduct
"would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output."
Id.
25 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
26 Id. at 409.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 410-13 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
I see nothing to warrant my assuming that the public will not be served
18

1989]

NOTE

975

activities should be judged in light of their purpose. 29 This recognition foreshadowed a continuing source of conflict for the
Court in later decisions between the application of per se versus
rule of reason analysis.30
In United States v. Colgate & Co. ,3 the Court first confronted a
scenario involving a unilateral action by a manufacturer. 32 Colgate, through distribution of circulars and price lists, established
the prices at which it wished its products be sold.33 It was further
explained to the dealers that deviation from those prices would
result in the termination of Colgate's relationship with that
dealer.34 Upholding Colgate's right to determine with whom it
will contract,35 the Court stressed that a party may predetermine
and announce the basis on which it will refuse to sell. 36 The
Court reasoned that the fact Colgate allowed the retailer to set
prices as it saw fit avoided the problem raised in Dr. Miles, even
though the retailer in Colgate was effectively in the same position.37 Therefore, the unilateral nature of the conduct by Colgate distinguished the Colgate decision from the Court's earlier
Dr. Miles decision. 38
Twenty-five years later, in United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. ,3 the Court reaffirmed the position it espoused in Colgate.
The Bausch & Lomb Court considered an arrangement in which
best by the company being allowed to carry out its plan. I cannot believe that in the long run the public will profit by this court permitting
knaves to cut reasonable prices for some ulterior purpose of their own
and thus to impair, if not to destroy, the production and sale of articles
which it is assumed to be desirable that the public should be able to get.
Id. at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
29 Id.
30 See, e.g., National Soc. of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)
(horizontal agreement prohibiting competitive bidding constitutes price fixing and
is illegal per se); Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)
(rule of reason applied to exclusive territory agreement); United States v. Arnold
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (per se rule used in non-price vertical restraints); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (per se
rule applied to horizontal price fixing).
31 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 302-03.
34 Id. at 305-06.
35 Id. at 307. "The retailer, after buying, could, if he chose, give away his
purchase, or sell it at any price he saw fit, or not sell it at all.... [B]y his action [he
may] incur the displeasure of the manufacturer, who could refuse to make further
sales to him ..
" Id. at 306.
36 Id. at 306-07.
37 Id. at 307-08.
38 Id.
39 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
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Soft-Lite, a distributor of tinted eyeglass lenses, established its
wholesale and retail network through licensing agreements.40
Soft-Lite sold only to licensed wholesalers who, in turn, were
only permitted to sell to licensed retailers. 4 This methodology
of controlling the distribution network, the Court found, exceeded the unilateral conduct validated in Colgate.4 2 The Court
determined that Soft-Lite's actions constituted "a conspiracy to
maintain prices down the distribution system, ' 4 3 and therefore
held Soft-Lite's actions to be illegal per se under section 1 of the
Sherman Act.4 4
The Court's position in Bausch & Lomb was confirmed in
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. , wherein the Court concluded
that the defendant's actions exceeded the scope of the Colgate
doctrine which protected a distributor's right to refuse to do
business with a party.4 6 In this case Parke, Davis was found to
have violated the Sherman Act by actively threatening to not fill
dealers' future orders as a method of ensuring that they comply
with its suggested retail prices. 47 The Court held that this vertical arrangement was illegal per se. 4 8
Three years later, in White Motor Co. v. United States, 49 the
Court addressed the question of whether contracts which restricted the geographical boundaries of retailers' activities represented a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 5 0 The White Motor
Court held that horizontal territorial agreements are per se violations, and that such agreements "are naked restraints of trade
with no purpose except [the] stifling of competition."'5 HowId. at 709-10.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 729.
43 Id. at 720.
44 Id. at 729.
45 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
46 Id. at 43. The Court stated:
[An unlawful combination is not just such as arises from a price maintenance agreement, express or implied; such a combination is also organized if the producer secures adherence to his suggested prices by means
which go beyond his mere declination to sell to a customer who will not
observe his announced policy.
Id. (emphasis in original).
47 Id. at 33.
48 Id. at 47.
49 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
50 Id. The district court held that geographical restrictions placed on distributors and retailers were per se violations and therefore exercised its power of summary judgment. Id. at 256.
5' Id. at 263.
40
41
42
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ever, the territorial arrangements in White Motor were vertical in
52
nature and thus were subject to rule of reason analysis.
Shortly after White Motor, the case of United States v. General
Motors Corp.53 presented the Court with a more onerous example
of a vertical combination. In General Motors, several automobile
dealer associations in the Los Angeles area banded together to
force General Motors to eliminate the discount auto sales in the
region.54 The Court avoided dealing with the territorial restraint
issue, and instead focused on whether a combination or conspiracy existed.55 The Court found "a classic conspiracy in restraint
of trade" in the dealer association's action with General Motors
to eliminate the discount auto trade and analogized the boycott
to a horizontal agreement. 56 The Court accordingly ruled the
boycott's "pernicious effect on competition"
to be a per se viola57
Act.
Sherman
the
of
1
section
tion of
The Court broadened the applicability of the per se rule in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.5 8 In Schwinn, the Court grap-

pled with dealer territorial and resale restrictions, rather than
price fixing, imposed by the manufacturer.59 Schwinn sold to dis52

Id. at 264.

53 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
54 Id. at 133-38. The dealers contended that the discounters, often including
dealers acting in concert with the discounters, violated the "location clause" in the
dealer selling agreement. Id. at 139. The agreement prohibited "a franchised
dealer from moving to or establishing 'a new or different location, branch sales
officer, branch service station, or place of business . . . without the prior written
approval of Chevrolet.' " Id.
55 Id. at 139-41. "[B]ecause the action taken constitutes a combination or conspiracy, it is not necessary to consider what might be the legitimate interest of a
dealer in securing compliance by others with the 'location clause,' or the lawfulness
of action a dealer might individually take to vindicate this interest." Id. at 140.
56 Id. The Court found a "joint, collaborative action by dealers, the appellee
associations, and General Motors to eliminate a class of competitors by terminating
business dealings between them and a minority of Chevrolet dealers and to deprive
franchised dealers of their freedom to deal through discounters if they so choose."
Id.
57 Id. at 146 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1957)). "There can be no doubt that the effect of the combination or conspiracy
here was to restrain trade and commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
Elimination, by joint collaborative action, of discounters from access to the market
is a per se violation of the Act." Id. at 145.
58 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
59 Id. at 372-73. The Court found Schwinn to involve:
a truly vertical arrangement, raising the fundamental question of the degree to which a manufacturer may not only select the customers to
whom he will sell, but also allocate territories for resale and confine access to his product to selected, or franchised, retailers. We conclude
that the proper application of § 1 of the Sherman Act to this problem
requires differentiation between the situation where the manufacturer
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tributors directly (thereby surrendering title to the goods) and
through a consignment scheme whereby Schwinn retained title to
the goods. 6° The Schwinn Court departed from the standard enumerated in White Motor, holding that agreements pertaining to restraints on the resale of goods were per se violations. 6 However,
restraints over goods to which Schwinn retained title, in the
Court's view, were instead subject to rule of reason analysis.62
The bifurcated standards of review established in Schwinn
proved to be short lived. In Continental T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc. ,63 the Court reviewed and overturned the Schwinn doctrine
regarding restraints in a vertical distribution system. 64 Continental alleged that Sylvania, by its franchise agreement allowing
Continental to sell Sylvania's products only at specific locations,
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.65 The Court held that per
se illegality applied only where the vertical restraints questioned
were "conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use."' 66 Further, the
Court stated that the Schwinn Court's distinction "between sale
and non-sale transactions" was not sufficient to sustain the bifurcated standards of review established in Schwinn. 67 Therefore,
the Sylvania Court concluded that the rule of reason standard
parts with title, dominion, or risk with respect to the article, and where
he completely retains ownership and risk of loss.
Id. at 378-79.
60 Id. at 379-80.
61 Id. at 382. The Court reasoned that:
When we look to the product market as a whole, we cannot conclude
that Schwinn's franchise system with respect to products as to which it
retains ownership and risk constitutes an unreasonable restraint of
trade. This does not, of course, excuse or condone the per se violations
which, in substance, consist of the control over the resale of Schwinn's
products after Schwinn has parted with ownership thereof.
Id.
62 Id. at 380-81. The Court concluded that "the vertically imposed distribution
restraints - absent price fixing and in the presence of adequate sources of alternative products to meet the needs of the unfranchised-may not be held to be per se
violations of the Sherman Act." Id. at 381 (emphasis in original).
63 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
64 Id. at 58.
65 Id. at 40.
66 Id. at 57 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958)).
67 Id. The Sylvania Court concluded "that the distinction drawn in Schwinn between sale and nonsale transactions is not sufficient to justify the application of a
per se rule in one situation and a rule of reason in the other." Id.
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should be used to evaluate all non-price vertical restrictions.6 8
The logic developed in Sylvania was subsequently applied by
the Court in a distributor termination case. In Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp.,69 the Court confronted the question of
whether the termination of a price cutting distributor was illegal
per se under section 1 of the Act. 70 Spray-Rite alleged that Monsanto and several of its other distributors conspired to set Monsanto's resale prices, and that Spray-Rite's distributorship was
terminated because of Spray-Rite's failure to abide by those
prices. 7 ' The district court had instructed the jury that if Monsanto conspired with other distributors with the intent to fix
prices, as inferred by other distributors' complaints, the action
constituted a per se violation.72 While affirming the lower court's
findings that Monsanto conspired with others to fix prices, the
Court held that such findings should have been based upon evidence concerning whether the parties "had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful
objective," rather than based upon other distributors' complaints. 7' The Court, however, concluded that the jury had been
supplied sufficient evidence to find that Monsanto had agreed
with its other distributors to fix prices and that Spray-Rite had
been terminated for failure to abide by the agreement. 4
Within this historical framework the Court was recently
presented with another distributor termination question. 75 Specifically, in Sharp, the Court was asked to decide whether a vertical restraint is illegal per se where there is no agreement
regarding price or price levels.76
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began his analysis by
recognizing that the Sherman Act has always been applied "to
prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade."' 77 This had been
accomplished in the past through the case by case analysis apply68 Id. at 59. Summarizing its holding, the Court posited that "[w]hen anticompetitive effects are shown to result from particular vertical restrictions they can be
adequately policed under the rule of reason, the standard traditionally applied for
the majority of anticompetitive practices challenged under § 1 of the Act." Id.
69 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
70 Id. at 757.
71 Id. at 756-57.
72 Id. at 757.
73 Id. at 768.
74 Id. at 768 n.14.
75 Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515
(1988).
76 Id. at 1525.
77 Id. at 1519. Justice Kennedy did not take part in the decision. Id. at 1525.
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ing the rule of reason. 78 Application of the rule of reason consists of attempting to assess the impact of the questioned activity
on free competition. 79 The Sharp Court, however, determined
that certain activities are so patently detrimental to free competition as to be per se illegal.8 ° While horizontal resale price agreements have been held to be illegal per se, 81 Justice Scalia
recognized that "the scope of per se illegality should be narrow in
the context of vertical restraints. '82 The Court stated that, for
the per se rule to apply to vertical restraints, the anti-competitive
effect of such restraints must be economically demonstrable.8 "
The Court noted that the per se rule was not needed to protect intrabrand competition84 where interbrand competition provides a " 'significant check' on any attempt to exploit intrabrand
8 5 The Court also determined that if vertical remarket power."1

straints are illegal per se, manufacturers interested in controlling
the ultimate marketing of their products would be forced to integrate the product distribution system into their own operations.86 Such an integration would have the impact of
eliminating opportunities to create that distribution system by
small businesses.8 7 Accordingly, the Court reasoned that this
hampering of the development of small business opportunities, a
restriction on trade, was diametrically opposed to the objectives
of the Sherman Act. 88 For these reasons, the Court concluded
that the rule of reason standard enunciated in GTE Sylvania
Id. at 1519.
Id. See also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49
(1977).
80 Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1519.
81 See FTC v. Indiana Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986); National
Soc. of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at
50.
82 Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1519.
83 Id. at 1520-2 1. The Court noted that "in the vertical restraint context 'departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based on demonstrable economic
effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.' " Id. at 1519 (quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59). The Sharp Court therefore concluded that "vertical nonprice restraints had not been shown to have such a 'pernicious effect on
competition' and to be so 'lack[ing] [in] . . . redeeming value' as to justify per se
illegality." Id. at 1519 (quoting Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 5 (1958)).
84 Id. at 1520.
85 Id. (quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52). The Court reasoned that "a manufacturer's dominant incentive is to lower resale prices" in an attempt to meet or beat
interbrand competition. Id. (citation omitted).
86 Id.
87 Id.
78

79

88 Id.
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should similarly be applied to vertical non-price restrictions.8 9
In applying the above enunciated standards to the case at
hand, the Court found that there was no agreement to fix prices
involved in Sharp's decision to terminate BEC.9 ° The Court reasoned that Sharp's decision, while impacting on price levels, did
not subject it to the terse restrictions of the per se rule.9 ' An
alternate holding, according to Justice Scalia, would force manufacturers to forego legitimate business options concerning vertical restraints because they may imply price fixing. 9 2 The Court
concluded that, given the variety of valid reasons for termination
of a distributor which will necessarily impact upon price levels,
the application of rule of reason analysis was mandated.9 3
The Court next examined the common law relevant to restraint of trade which has been incorporated into the Sherman
Act.9 4 The Court acknowledged that the common law definition
of restraint of trade was not a "static" concept in 1890 and continues to "evolve[] with new circumstances and new wisdom." 9 5
In other words, both the line at which per se illegality becomes
applicable and the analysis utilized under the rule of reason must
be permitted to adjust to developing economic realities. 96
Justice Scalia next dismissed BEC's contention that the facts
presented paralleled a horizontal combination, rather than the
89

Id. at 1520-21. The Court stated that:
there is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason standard; that departure from that standard must be justified by demonstrable economic effect, such as the facilitation of cartelizing, rather, than formalistic
distinctions; that interbrand competition is the primary concern of the
antitrust laws; and that rules in this area should be formulated with a
view towards protecting the doctrine of GTE Sylvania.

Id.
90 Id. at 1521.

91 Id.
92 Id. In noting that it would be "extremely difficult for the manufacturer to
convince a jury that its motivation was to insure adequate services, since price cutting and some measure of service cutting usually go hand in hand," the Sharp Court
held that manufacturers would "forego legitimate and competitively useful conduct
rather than risk treble damages and perhaps even criminal penalties." Id.
93 Id. at 1521-22.
94 Id. at 1523.
95 Id. at 1523-24. The Court stated if the term "restraint of trade" was not interpreted as a fluid concept, "not only would the line of per se illegality have to be
drawn today precisely where it was in 1890, but also case-by-case evaluation of legality (conducted where per se rules do not apply) would have to be governed by
19th-century notions of reasonableness." Id. at 1524. The Court further stated
that it "would make no sense to create out of the single term 'restraint of trade' a
chronologically schizoid statute ......
Id.
96 Id.

982

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19:972

vertical combinations the Court found controlling. 97 While BEC
attempted to compare the case at bar to Parke, Davis,9" the Court
distinguished Sharp by noting that Parke, Davis exercised direct
control over prices among competitors. 99 In conclusion, the majority held that vertical restraints are not illegal per se unless they
include an agreement specifically establishing price or price
levels. 100
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens disputed the majority's finding that the issue in Sharp involved a vertical non-price
agreement. 1 1 Instead, the Justice viewed the facts as involving
an agreement to control prices among retailers, thus creating a
per se illegal horizontal agreement.' 2 Justice Stevens maintained that the majority erred in several respects by finding the
10 3
termination of BEC to be valid.
The first issue raised by Justice Stevens centered around the
majority's lack of concern for the differentiation between "naked
restraints" and "ancillary restraints."' 10 4 Quoting extensively
from Judge Taft's opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co.,105 the dissent noted that the common law concerns regarding prohibition of naked restraints were included in the Sherman
Act.' 0 6 After a discussion of the characteristics of this type of restraint, Justice Stevens concluded that the agreement present in
10 7
this case did, in fact, constitute a naked restraint of trade.
Moreover, Justice Stevens asserted that this case did not involve a vertical non-price agreement because the manufacturer
and second distributor implicitly agreed to a new general price
level. 10 8 This agreement was therefore distinguishable from Colgate in that Sharp's action was not unilateral, but instead moti97 Id. at 1524-25.

98 Id. at 1525.
99 Id.
100 Id.

1o Id. at 1526 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice White joined in the dissent. Id.
See id.
103 Id. at 1526-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 1526 (Stevens, J., dissenting). An example of an ancillary restraint is a
covenant not to compete in conjunction with the sale of a business. Id. Conversely,
naked restraints are restraints whose only object is the restraint of trade. Id. at
1530 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253, 263 (1963)).
105 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affid, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
1O6 Sharp, 108 S.Ct. at 1526-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 1526-27, 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 1528 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102
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vated by the complaints of the second distributor.' 0 9 Although
the dissent conceded that the independent, unilateral termina-

tion of a distributor by a manufacturer was a legal transaction,
Justice Stevens found that the implicit agreement between Sharp
and Hartwell to eliminate BEC constituted a "naked restraint[] of

trade with no purpose except [the] stifling of competition.""

0

The dissent further noted that in General Motors, the Court
found a boycott of several automobile dealers against discounters
to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act."' Justice Stevens
found the facts in Sharp indistinguishable from those presented
in General Motors, since the boycott in General Motors was analogous to Hartwell's ultimatum to Sharp. 1 2 Additionally, the dissent criticized the majority's failure to recognize the value of
1
intrabrand competition in advancing interbrand competition.' 3
However, Justice Stevens concluded that such a concern would
have been adequate to justify the restraints imposed by the
manufacturer.' 14

Finally, Justice Stevens took exception to the majority's failure to recognize the safeguard created by the significant burden
of proof placed on the terminated dealer." 5 Reaffirming his belief that juries will continue to be able to distinguish between
valid and pretextual defenses in anti-trust litigation, Justice Stevens reasoned that the burden of proof set forth in Monsanto
would protect dealers in subsequent termination proceedings." 6
The Court's decision in Sharp has continued the process of
narrowing the per se rule's applicability to vertical agree109 Id.

110 Id. at 1530 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)).
''' Id. at 1532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112 Id.
113 Id.

114 Id. at 1532-33 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
115 Id. at 1534-35 (Stevens,J., dissenting). First, a "terminated dealer must introduce 'evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and
nonterminated distributors were acting independently.' " Id. at 1534 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764
(1984)). "Second, the terminated dealer must prove that the agreement was based
on a purpose to terminate it because of its price cutting." Id. at 1534-35 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Lastly, "the manufacturer may rebut the evidence tending to prove
that the sole purpose of the agreement was to eliminate a price cutter by offering
evidence that it entered the agreement for legitimate, nonprice-related reasons."
Id. at 1535 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 1533-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ments."l 7 The Sharp majority requires that nonprice vertical restraints be analyzed under the rule of reason standards
enumerated in Sylvania," 8 based on the evidentiary standards
presented in Monsanto." 9 By continuing, however, to recognize
the applicability of the per se rule to agreements that "include[]
some agreement on price or price levels," 120 the Court falls short
of the mark. Instead, rule of reason analysis should be extended
to apply to all vertical agreements, whether price driven or
not.12 1 Such an extension of the rule of reason's applicability
would continue to serve the objectives of the Sherman Act while
not hampering valid business activities. 122
Monopoly power has not been limited by recent judicial decisions concerning vertical restraints. By definition, no monopoly can exist where there is active interbrand competition, yet the
non-existence of such competition is self-correcting in a free
market. 23 If a manufacturer is fortunate enough, either through
117 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
118 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49. The Court stated the standard for the rule of reason
as follows:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse;
but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts
and to predict consequences.
Id. at 49 n.15 (quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918)).
119 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764.
120 Sharp, 108 S.Ct. at 1525.
121 See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 377, 473-74 (1966) (supporting the legality of vertical price
fixing); Posner, supra note 4, at 25 (vertical restraints are legal barring evidence of
agreements among dealers or distributors); Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and
the Rule of Reason, 53 ArITRUST L.J. 135, 159-68 (1984) (use of five filters to determine Sherman Act violations-market power, widespread adoption of identical
practices, effect on output, long-lived practices, and profits-violations must result
in reduction in competition).
122 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
123

See generally SAMUELSON,

ECONOMICS

(8th ed. 1970). Free competition exists

when a given market is open to new entrants and therefore subject to pressure from
competing products, forcing prices to the lowest level consistent with reasonable
profit. Id. at 39. The Sherman Act was enacted in reaction to real and perceived
damage done by monopolistic organizations. Id. at 501. The economic damage
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patent rights or creative energy, to have gained the advantage of
sole possession of a market, he deserves the rewards of that advantage. 124 In fact, patent laws are designed to protect such an
advantage. 125 Market forces combined with the legally protected
advantage of patent rights, where applicable, will therefore determine the extent and duration of that advantage. 126 Accordingly,
no reasonable governmental intervention between the manufacturer and its distributor or retailer will bring others into an otherwise unprofitable 127
market or keep them out of an otherwise
profitable market.

Market forces of the free enterprise system will automatically
control any evils derived from vertical price fixing agreements
without the need for judicial oversight. 128 Yet the Sharp Court
continued its support of the per se illegality of vertical price fixing agreements. 129 The majority posited that one potentially
valid reason for imposing this position is that vertical price fixing
agreements facilitate the cartelization of an industry. 30 While
this may be true, the cartelization of an industry is ascertainable
and controllable without the legal entanglements forced on business by application of the per se rule to vertical price fixing
agreements. Further, cartelization of an industry is in itself a
horizontal restraint of trade and, as such, has been recognized by
31
the Court as illegal per se.

done was via those organizations having the economic power to control a given
market and extort greater profits from that market than would otherwise be possible, thereby misallocating resources of the economy. Id. at 92-93. The foundation
of antitrust policy is that free competition will, over time, result in the most efficient
and therefore most favorable allocation of resources. Id. at 39.
124 F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE,
437-38 (2d ed. 1980). In a new market, the sole producer will reap the benefit of
having the only product available and will therefore charge prices that will result in
above average profits. Id. at 13. As others recognize the profits to be made in that
market, new entrants will force prices lower, absent an agreement between the
competing sellers. Id. But compare ARTHUR A. THOMPSON, JR., ECONOMICS OF THE
FIRM, THEORY AND PRACTICE 530-31 (2d ed. 1977), wherein the author stated
"[s]ome firms have abused the patent laws by aggressively buying up patents,
licenses, and copyrights so as to preclude the emergence of competition from rival
products." Id. at 530.
125 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 401-02
(1911). See also SCHERER, supra note 124, at 440-43.
126 See THOMPSON, supra note 124, at 530; SCHERER, supra note 124, at 13.
127 Id.
128 See id.
129 Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1519.
130 Id. at 1521.
131 See Bork, supra note 121, at 391. See also Easterbrook, supra note 121, at 14043.
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The Court has expressed its support for the premise that
business should be conducted without overbearing legal interference. t 32 Unfortunately, perpetuation of the per se rule in the
vertical agreement context continues such interference by forcing a manufacturer to ensure that resale price is not agreed upon
with its distributors in its distribution agreements.1 33 Such illusory guidelines do not improve the efficiency of a free enterprise
34
system. 1

Several alternatives to both the rule of reason and per se
methods for determining Sherman Act liability have been pro' 35
posed. Whether the Court adopts a rule of "per se legality,"'
"presumed legality,"' 6 or a specific series of "filters," 1 3 7 the
objectives sought by the Sherman Act would be better served.
Further, judicial resources would not be wasted on attempts to
apply superficial economic analysis to modern, dynamic market
conditions.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not yet met the challenge to "take the earliest opportunity to review its Russian roulette approach to vertical price restraints."' 3 8 Instead, by its
Sharp ruling, the Court has allowed the burdensome and complex
precedents of Sylvania and Monsanto to remain the standard
method for analyzing any vertical agreement.
Lawrence E. Behning
132 Sharp, 108 S. Ct. at 1520. See also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,
465 U.S. 759, 763-64 (1984).
133 See generally THOMPSON, supra note 124, at 529-31 (overview of ramifications
when business decisions do not include antitrust considerations).
134 See Posner, supra note 4, at 15. Referring to the Court's definition in Chicago
Bd. of Trade, Posner characterized the rule of reason as "[a] standard so poorly articulated and particularized, applied by tribunals so poorly equipped to understand
and apply it, [which] places at considerable hazard any restriction that a manufacturer imposes on its dealers and distributors." Id. (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).

135

Id.

See Hay, supra note 4, at 436-40.
See Easterbrook, supra note 121, at 157-168.
138 Sharp, 780 F.2d at 1222 (Jones, J., concurring). In her concurring opinion,
Judge Jones, regarding vertical price restraints, articulated that:
The larger conclusion that can be drawn from the scenario of this case is
that assuming the continued variety, vitality and innovation of the American free enterprise system, it is unrealistic to conclude that measures
taken by a manufacturer to enhance his product's marketability, whether
related to price or not, are anticompetitive unless they are part of a program to enforce a manufacturer- or dealer-level cartel.
Id. at 1221 (Jones, J., concurring).
136
137

